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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Albert A. Ciccone appeals from the judgment and sentence entered upon 
the jury verdicts finding him guilty of one count of first degree murder and one 
count of second degree murder. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On October 16, 2003, Ciccone drove at an estimated speed of 50 miles 
per hour and intentionally struck his pregnant wife, Kathleen, with his vehicle as 
she walked away from him following an argument. (Trial Tr.,1 p.1112, Ls.4-18, 
p.1114, Ls. 11-18, p.1124, L.20 - p.1125, L.4, p.1130, L.20 - p.1131, L.17; 
State's Exhibits2 62, 63.) The car hit Kathleen with such force that she bounced 
off the windshield, launched into the air, went through a fence and slammed 
against a tree 75 feet away from the point of impact. (Trial Tr., p.483, L.10 -
p.485, L.19, p.506, L.17 - p.509, L.12, p.1116, Ls.9-18.) Witnesses at the scene 
immediately called 911 and rushed to Kathleen's side. (Trial Tr., p.508, Ls.18-
1 By order of the Idaho Supreme Court, the appellate record in this case has 
been augmented with the "Court File, Reporter's Transcript, and Clerk's Record" 
filed in Ciccone's prior appeal, State v. Ciccone, Docket No. 36877 (formerly 
designated Docket No. 32179). (5/31/11 Order Augmenting Appeal.) Consistent 
with the Appellant's brief, citations herein to the appellate record and transcript(s) 
prepared in Docket No. 36877 contain no identifying prefix. The supplemental 
clerk's record prepared for this appeal, Docket No. 38817, is cited herein as 
"#38817 R" 
2 The state is, contemporaneously with the filing of this brief, filing a motion to 
augment the appellate record with several documents that were submitted as 
exhibits in Ciccone's prior appeal, Docket No. 36877. Specifically, the state is 
requesting an order augmenting the appellate record with State's Exhibits 62 and 
63, both of which were admitted as exhibits at Ciccone's trial, and with the PSI 
and its attachments. 
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22, p.510, L.16 - p.511, L.22, p.513, L.24 - p.514, L.16.) Ciccone, on the other 
hand, got out of his car, looked from a distance at Kathleen's lifeless body and 
walked away from the scene. (Trial Tr., p.515, L.6 - p.519, L.19.) 
Law enforcement and rescue personnel subsequently found Ciccone in 
the desert about a mile and a half away from the crash site. (Trial Tr., p.609, L.1 
- p.611, L.19, p.669, L.6 - p.671, L.22, p.992, L.18 - p.993, L.3, p.1165, Ls.8-13, 
p.1179, Ls.14-16, p.1311, L.18 - p.1313, L.11.) He was relatively unscathed, did 
not display any physical symptoms of shock and, although he claimed to have 
blacked out, had no confirmed neurological trauma. (Trial Tr., p.614, Ls.5-12, 
p.672, L.5 - p.677, L.8, p.683, L.22 - p.684, L.22, p.1166, L.5 - p.1167, LA, 
p.1170, L.10 - p.1178, L.13, p.1181, L.16 - p.1182, L.9, p.1318, L.5 - p.1329, 
L.2.) He was treated at the hospital for a sore ankle and released the same night 
to the custody of law enforcement. (Trial Tr., p.1166, L.10 - p.1167, LA, p.1475, 
L.19 - p.1476, L.14.) Kathleen suffered multiple head fractures and she and her 
unborn child died at the scene. (Trial Tr., p.563, L.23 - p.565, L.21, p.576, L.21 
- p.577, L.14, p.603, L.18 - p.604, LA, p.664, L.25 - p.667, L.10, p.1309, LS.1-
24.) 
The state charged Ciccone with two counts of first degree murder. (R., 
vol. I, pp.60-61.) Following a trial, a jury found Ciccone guilty of the first degree 
murder of Kathleen and the second degree murder of the fetus Kathleen was 
carrying when she died. (R., vol. II, pp.286-93.) The district court entered 
judgment on the jury's verdicts and imposed a fixed life sentence upon Ciccone's 
conviction for first degree murder and a concurrent fixed 15-year sentence upon 
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his conviction for second degree murder. (R., vol. II, pp.338-41.) Ciccone 
appealed (R., vol. II, pp.346-50) but, after the case was briefed and argued to 
both the Idaho Court of Appeals and the Idaho Supreme Court, the Idaho 
Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on the basis that it was not timely from the 
judgment of conviction, State v. Ciccone, 150 Idaho 305, 246 P.3d 958 (2010). 
Pursuant to a stipulation and order entered in post-conviction proceedings, the 
district court reentered judgment to permit Ciccone to file a timely direct appeal. 
(#38817 R., pp.16-20.) Ciccone filed a timely notice of appeal on April 26, 2011. 
(#38817 R., pp.21-25.) 
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ISSUES 
Ciccone states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the prosecutor engage in misconduct by twice 
commenting on Mr. Ciccone's silence and then asking the 
jury to convict Mr. Ciccone based on sympathy for the 
victim? 
2. Were Mr. Ciccone's speedy trial rights violated when, on the 
eve of trial, the district court granted the State's motion for a 
continuance and set Mr. Ciccone's trial out an additional six 
months? 
3. Is Mr. Ciccone's fixed life sentence for first degree murder 
excessive given any view of the facts? 
(Appellant's brief, p.g.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Ciccone failed to show he is entitled to relief with respect to any of his 
claims of prosecutorial misconduct? 
2. Has Ciccone failed to establish a violation of either his constitutional or 
statutory speedy trial rights? 
3. Has Ciccone failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion 
in imposing a fixed life sentence upon his conviction for first degree 
murder? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Ciccone Is Not Entitled To Relief On Any Of His Prosecutorial Misconduct Claims 
A. Introduction 
Ciccone argues that the prosecutor made several comments during the 
rebuttal portion of the state's closing argument that prejudiced his right to a fair 
trial. (Appellant's brief, pp.9-21.) Ciccone has failed to establish any basis for 
reversal, however, because has failed to show any impropriety with respect to 
the only comment to which he objected, and he has otherwise failed to carry his 
burden of demonstrating that the remaining comments, to which he did not 
object, amount to fundamental error. 
B. Standard Of Review And General Legal Standards Governing Claims Of 
Prosecutorial Misconduct 
"[T]he standard of review governing claims of prosecutorial misconduct 
depends on whether the defendant objected to the misconduct at trial." State v. 
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 715, 215 P.3d 414, 435 (2009). If the alleged error 
was followed by a contemporaneous objection at trial, the defendant bears the 
initial burden on appeal of establishing that the complained of conduct was 
improper. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010). 
"Where the defendant meets his initial burden of showing that a violation 
occurred, the State then has the burden of demonstrating to the appellate court 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the constitutional violation did not contribute to 
the jury's verdict." lsi 
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When, on the other hand, a defendant fails to timely object at trial to 
allegedly improper closing arguments by the prosecutor, the conviction will be set 
aside for prosecutorial misconduct only upon a showing by the defendant that the 
alleged misconduct rises to the level of fundamental error. !sL at 228, 245 P.3d 
at 980. Review under the fundamental error doctrine requires the defendant to 
demonstrate that (1) "one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional 
rights were violated;" (2) the constitutional error is "clear or obvious" on the 
record, "without the need for any additional information" including information "as 
to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision;" and (3) "the error affected 
the defendant's substantial rights," generally by showing a reasonable probability 
that the error "affected the outcome of the trial proceedings." !sL at 226, 245 P.3d 
at 978 (footnote omitted). 
Whether preserved by objection at trial or reviewed for fundamental error, 
a mere assertion or finding that a particular question or statement was 
objectionable or improper is insufficient to establish prosecutorial misconduct. As 
explained by the United States Supreme Court: "[I]t is not enough that the 
prosecutors' remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned. The 
relevant question is whether the prosecutors' comments so infected the trial with 
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process." Darden 
v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted); see also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982) ("[T]he touchstone 
of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the 
fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.") State v. Reynolds, 120 
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Idaho 445,451,816 P.2d 1002,1008 (Ct. App. 1991) (the function of appellate 
review is "not to discipline the prosecutor for misconduct, but to ensure that any 
such misconduct did not interfere with the defendant's right to a fair trial"). 
C. Ciccone Is Not Entitled To Relief On Either Of His Allegations That The 
Prosecutor Engaged In Misconduct By Commenting On His Silence 
Ciccone argues the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by "twice 
comment[ing]" on Ciccone's failure to testify during his rebuttal closing argument. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.10-16.) Ciccone's claims fail because the arguments he 
challenges, when reviewed in context, are neither improper nor fundamental 
error. 
Prosecutors have considerable latitude in closing argument and have the 
right to discuss the evidence and the inferences and deductions arising 
therefrom. State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548,566, 199 P.3d 123, 141 (2008); State 
v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280, 77 P.3d 956, 969 (2003); State v. Phillips, 144 
Idaho 82, 86, 156 P.3d 583, 587 (Ct. App. 2007). The purpose of the 
prosecutor's closing argument is to enlighten the jury and help the jurors 
remember and interpret the evidence. State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445, 450, 
816 P.2d 1002, 1007 (Ct. App. 1991). Where, as here, the complained of 
comments occurred during a rebuttal closing argument, the United States 
Supreme Court has held, "[t]he prosecutors' comments must be evaluated in light 
of the defense argument that preceded it." Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 
179 (1986). 
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In this case, two of the statements about which Ciccone complains were 
made in response to the general theme of defense counsel's closing argument, 
and the theory of Ciccone's defense, that Kathleen's death was nothing more 
than a tragic accident that occurred because Ciccone was "in a hurry" and "going 
too fast." (Trial Tr., p.1826, Ls.10-12, p.1828, Ls.11-22, p.1842, Ls.5-8, p.1845, 
Ls.12-24, p.1846, Ls.11-13, p.1847, Ls.1-2.) Ciccone did not testify at trial, but 
his version of the events leading to Kathleen's death was admitted in the form of 
Mirandized statements he made to the lead detective during two custodial 
interviews. (Trial Tr., p.1476, L.4 - p.1477, L.25, p.1491, L.8 - p.1492, L.15, 
p.15, L.18, p.1505, Ls.7-11; State's Exhibits 62, 63.) As part of his closing 
argument, counsel for Ciccone referred to Ciccone's statements during one of 
the interviews and asked the jury to reject the state's theory that Ciccone and 
Kathleen had an argument immediately before Ciccone ran Kathleen down in the 
road. Specifically, counsel argued: 
Now, we have seen from the evidence on the K & R ranch 
Road that we have French fries, we had cigarettes, we had Icee, 
we had a sweater, we had a purse, we had track marks all on the K 
& R Ranch Road. 
[Ciccone] stated in the interview Kathleen had the food on 
her side. The purse was found in the middle of the road. But think 
about it. A woman's purse. That's a sacred thing. The State 
seems to imply that [Ciccone] was throwing the purse. [Ciccone] 
was throwing the medicine. [Ciccone] was throwing the food. 
That's totally inconsistent with our day-to-day norm. It is totally 
inconsistent with the evidence. 
They don't dispute the fact that the bag, the Burger King, 
and the Icee was in Kathleen's possession. How many women do 
we know that will reach in a car that she is a passenger in and put 
the purse somewhere where [Ciccone] could throw it at her? That 
simply does not make sense. 
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So you have got a purse. You have got food. You have got 
a tiff, you've got a huff, however you want to classify it. The 
accident scene. 
(Trial Tr., p.1833, L.5 - p.1834, L.3.) 
In response, the prosecutor argued: 
Let's talk about [counsel] talking about the scene on K & R 
Ranch Road. How this precious purse a woman would have 
carried, the bag of food she obviously had in her possession 
because that's what [Ciccone] said. 
So I guess she has got the purse in the car, the bag of food 
in the car, the medicine, the sweater tied around her and 
everything. And she decided to get out with all of that stuff on K & 
R Ranch Road ... and decided to walk however many feet -- let's 
just say -- it is on the chart -- walk up there with all the purse, 
sweatshirt tied around her waist, bottle of pills, and all the food bag, 
and had enough wherewithal to throw it all at him right- or left-
handed. Maybe she put the purse down to get the McDonalds bag 
or Burger King to throw at him. Maybe she just left it there. I don't 
know. There's only two people that know, and Kathleen Ciccone 
isn't here to tell us. 
(Trial Tr., p.1853, Ls.3-23.) 
For the first time on appeal, Ciccone argues that the last sentence of the 
prosecutor's argument, referring to "only two people that know," was an 
impermissible comment on Ciccone's failure to testify "because he is the only 
one who could have told the jury the circumstances of his argument with 
Kathleen." (Appellant's brief, p.12.) Ciccone, however, has failed to show that 
the complained of comments constituted misconduct at all, much less 
misconduct rising to the level of fundamental error. 
When considered in context, it is clear the prosecutor was not commenting 
on Ciccone's failure to testify. Quite the contrary, the prosecutor was only 
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responding to defense counsel's reference to Ciccone's explanation during his 
interview with Detective Wolfe about the state of certain evidence, such as 
Kathleen's purse, at the murder scene and how that explanation was supposedly 
consistent with Ciccone's claim that he "accidentally" hit Kathleen with his car. 
Because the prosecutor's comments centered around Ciccone's actual 
statements and Kathleen's inability to refute them, rather than Ciccone's failure to 
testify, Ciccone has failed to establish error, much less any constitutional error 
that is "clear or obvious" from the record and actually prejudiced Ciccone's right 
to a fair trial. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. 
Ciccone's second claim of prosecutorial misconduct is similar to his first in 
that it is based on an assertion that the prosecutor made an impermissible 
reference to Ciccone's failure to testify. Specifically, Ciccone complains about 
the following comments made during the prosecutor's rebuttal closing: 
There is no testimony that he was looking down at is [sic] 
watch, that the cigarette smoke had blown in his face, that he was 
changing the radio station, that a cassette dropped, a cigarette 
dropped in his pants, he had to try and put it out real quick. No 
testimony as to that. Absolutely none. He doesn't say anything 
about any--
(Trial Tr., p.1856, Ls.2-9.) 
Ciccone objected to this argument, the court sustained the objection, and 
a discussion was held off the record. (Trial Tr., p.1856, Ls.10-13.) In addition, at 
the conclusion of the prosecutor's rebuttal closing, the court admonished the jury: 
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the jury will disregard any 
argument based upon what the defendant did not say. As stated 
earlier in instruction 55, a defendant in a criminal trial has a 
constitutional right not to be compelled to testify. The decision of 
whether to testify is left to the defendant acting with the advice and 
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assistance of the defendant's lawyer. You must not draw any 
inference of guilt from the fact the defendant did not testify." 
(Trial Tr., p.1861, L.25 - p.1861, L.4.) 
Ciccone argues the prosecutor's comments violated his Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment right to silence because "he is the only one who could 
have offered 'testimony' to explain how it was that he was unable to avoid hitting 
his wife with his vehicle." (Appellant's brief, p.12.) Ciccone's argument fails 
because, although the district court sustained Ciccone's objection to the 
prosecutor's argument and the court's subsequent admonishment indicates it did 
so on the theory that the prosecutor's comments were an improper reference to 
Ciccone's failure to testify, the prosecutor's comments can equally be viewed as 
a comment not on Ciccone's silence or his failure to testify, but on the absence of 
any reasonable explanation during his interview with Detective Wolfe from which 
the jury could conclude Kathleen's death was the result of an accident. 
While it is undoubtedly true that a prosecutor may not comment on a 
defendant's silence or his failure to testify as evidence of his guilt, State v. 
Severson, 147 Idaho 694,718-19,215 P.3d 414,438-39 (2009), the prosecutor's 
comments must be viewed in light of the evidence presented to the jury, and the 
Court should not "lightly infer ... the most damaging meaning" or assume the 
jury "dr[e]w that meaning from. .. less damaging interpretations." Donnelly v. 
DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637,647 (1974) quoted in Severson, 147 Idaho at 719, 
214 P.3d at 439. Rather, as explained in State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445,449-
50, 816 P.2d 1002, 1006-07 (Ct. App. 1991), "the propriety of a given argument 
will depend largely upon the facts of each case" and the prosecutor may properly 
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present argument based on the evidence in the record. See also Severson, 147 
Idaho at 719, 215 P.3d at 439 (prosecutor's "comments must be evaluated 'in 
light of defense conduct and in the context of the entire trial"') (citations omitted). 
The evidence in the record in this case included the transcripts of two 
interviews between Detective Wolfe and Ciccone. (State's Exhibits 62, 63.) 
During those interviews, Ciccone talked about the "accident," but never gave any 
reasonable explanation of how the "accident" occurred, such as those suggested 
by the prosecutor during his rebuttal closing argument. While the prosecutor's 
use of the word "testimony" in making his argument may have been inartful, it is 
plausible that he was merely referring to the absence of any reasonable 
explanation during Ciccone's interviews, not on his failure to testify or his post-
Miranda silence because Ciccone was undoubtedly not silent during those 
interviews. Given the two possible interpretations of the prosecutor's rebuttal 
argument regarding the absence of "testimony" regarding how an "accident" may 
have occurred, the Court "cannot conclude that [the prosecutor's comment] was 
manifestly intended to be, or of such a character that the jury would naturally and 
necessarily take it to be" an impermissible reference to Ciccone's failure to 
testify. Reynolds, 120 Idaho at 450,816 P.2d at 1007. See also Severson, 147 
Idaho at 719, 215 P.3d at 439 (declining to attach most damaging meaning to 
prosecutor's statement that "Nobody knows, that has testified, what happened 
between" the victim and the defendant). 
Ciccone also argues that the court's admonishment was insufficient to 
remedy the prejudice attendant to what he deems to be the prosecutor's 
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impermissible comments on his silence. (Appellant's brief, pp.14-15.) Ciccone is 
incorrect. Even assuming this Court views the comments as an infringement on 
Ciccone's Fifth Amendment rights, any potential prejudice was cured by the 
court's instruction to the jury that it was to "disregard any argument based upon 
what the defendant did not say," and "must not draw any inference of guilt from 
the fact [Ciccone] did not testify." (Trial Tr., p.1860, L.24 - p.1861, L.g.) 
Ciccone's claim that this Court is precluded from finding the error harmless under 
State v. Lopez, 141 Idaho 575, 114 P.3d 133 (Ct. App. 2005), is without merit. 
(Appellant's brief, p.15.) 
In Lopez, the defendant claimed his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights were violated "when the state attempted to impeach him by questioning 
him and a detective regarding his failure to tell the officers his version of the 
events immediately after the incident." 141 Idaho at 577, 114 P.3d at 135. 
Although Lopez did not object to the questions at trial, the appellate court 
addressed his claim under a pre-Perry fundamental error analysis, and 
concluded the "state's comments in closing argument [were] impermissible uses 
of post-Miranda silence." 1st at 577-78, 114 P.3d at 135-36. Importantly, 
however, the court then conducted a harmless error analysis, noting the error 
was not reversible unless it was prejudicial. 1st at 578, 114 P.3d at 136. As 
such, Lopez clearly does not stand for the proposition advocated by Ciccone, i.e., 
that whenever a claim of prosecutorial misconduct based upon a comment on the 
defendant's silence is reviewed under the fundamental error doctrine, the error 
can never be harmless because it cannot be cured by a judicial admonition. 
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(Appellant's brief, p.15.) To the contrary, both before and after the reformulation 
of the fundamental error standard in Perry, the Idaho appellate courts have 
consistently subjected claims reviewed under the fundamental error doctrine to a 
harmless error analysis, including claims based on alleged prosecutorial 
misconduct in closing argument. See,~, State v. Adamcik, _ P.3d _, 
2012 WL 206006 *33 (Idaho, Jan. 25, 2012) (rehearing denied Feb. 8, 2012) 
(defendant failed to demonstrate prosecutor's objected-to improper closing 
remarks were not harmless where jury was instructed that prosecutor's closing 
statements were not evidence); Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980 
(defendant alleging prosecutorial misconduct for first time on appeal must not 
only demonstrate a clear violation of an unwaived constitutional right, but must 
also demonstrate that the alleged error "was not harmless"); State v. Timmons, 
145 Idaho 279, _,178 P.3d 644, 657 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Kuhn, 139 Idaho 
710,715-16,685 P.3d 1109, 1114-15 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Cortez, 135 Idaho 
561, 566, 21 P.3d 498, 503 (Ct. App. 2001); State v. Brown, 131 Idaho 61, 70, 
951 P.2d 1288, 1297 (Ct. App. 1998). 
Because, even assuming the prosecutor's statements were improper, the 
error was harmless due to the court's curative instruction, which the jury was 
presumed to have followed, Ciccone has failed to establish a due process 
violation entitling him to a new trial. 
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D. The Prosecutor's Unobjected-To Reference To Kathleen's Death As A 
Tragedy And His Request For Justice Did Not Constitute Misconduct 
In his closing argument, counsel for Ciccone, after asserting Kathleen's 
death was nothing more than a tragic accident, argued: 
Forget about the lawyers and lawsuit. He wishes he could 
bring her back, but he can't. So June Ciccone, Kathy Figueredo, 
they have held their kids in their hands all these years. I have held 
[Ciccone] in my hands for the past year. Now I am going to hand 
him over to you, each of you individually. You each hold [Ciccone] 
in your hands. You each have the power to make a decision. You 
each have the ability to decide how to handle this case, each and 
every one of you. And you can't let anybody else bully you. You 
can't let anybody else step on you. You have to go back there in 
that room, that little room back there, and decide. You, each of 
you, have to decide. 
You each have got [Ciccone] in your hands. You each get to 
decide. You each have that power. So use it, use it faithfully. 
Follow the rules given to you by the judge. Make sure he proves 
any case he has got beyond a reasonable doubt. Look at that 
evidence. Because right now, I am giving you [Ciccone]. Thank 
you. 
(Trial Tr., p.1847, L.13 - p.1848, L.13.) 
In rebuttal closing, the prosecutor commented, in relevant part: 
This case is about Kathleen Ciccone's death, not the 
mother's pains, not about Albert Ciccone's being in the hands of 
[defense counsel]. It is about how and why she died. 
When you kill somebody, you take away everything they 
have and everything they ever will have. Kathleen was 22 years 
old. Her death is a tragedy. Give her life meaning and give her 
death the sense of justice that it requires. Hold the defendant 
accountable for the purposeful, willful, deliberate, premeditated 
actions that he took that night. Thank you. 
(Trial Tr., p.1860, Ls.15-22.) 
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Although he did not object to any of the foregoing comments at trial, 
Ciccone argues on appeal that the prosecutor's comments in rebuttal were 
"plainly improper" and rose to the level of fundamental error because, he 
contends, "they asked the jury to convict Mr. Ciccone for a reason wholly 
irrelevant to his actual guilt or innocence - its sympathy for the deceased victim." 
(Appellant's brief, p.19.) More specifically, Ciccone claims "the prosecutor's 
focus on everything that had been lost when Kathleen died, and the sheer 
tragedy of her death, was an unabashed plea for the jury to convict Mr. Ciccone 
of the greatest charge, first degree murder, based on its sympathy for the victim." 
(Appellant's brief, p.19.) Ciccone's claim fails on all three prongs of the Perry 
test for fundamental error. 
The Idaho Supreme Court recently reiterated the standards applicable to a 
claim of fundamental error arising from a prosecutor's alleged appeal to the 
passions and prejudices of the jury: 
It is generally recognized that a prosecutor may not 
comment on the victim's family during closing argument in order to 
appeal to the sympathies of the jury. Such extraneous statements 
are considered improper because their only purpose is to 
encourage the jury to identify with the victim. Whether such 
comments constitute fundamental error, however, must be 
considered in the context of the entire trial. 
Severson, 147 Idaho at 720, 215 P.3d at 440, quoted in Adamcik, _ P.3d at 
_, 2012 WL 206006 *33. Here, when considered in context, it is clear that the 
prosecutor's characterization of Kathleen's death as a tragedy was not an 
"unabashed plea for the jury to convict" Ciccone of first-degree murder. Rather, 
the prosecutor was merely repeating what Ciccone himself already argued. That 
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the prosecutor followed his shared belief that Kathleen's death was a tragedy 
with a request for justice, did not render the comment misconduct, nor was his 
request that the jury give Kathleen's death justice and hold Ciccone accountable 
improper. See State v. Larsen, 81 Idaho 90, 98, 337 P.2d 1, 6 (1959) ("The 
general rule is that argument by the prosecuting attorney merely urging the jurors 
in a criminal prosecution to do their duty, and to enforce the criminal law 
generally or the particular law under which the prosecution was instituted, does 
not constitute a ground for a new trial or a reversal but is within the range of 
proper argument.") (citation omitted); State v. Adams, 147 Idaho 857, 864, 216 
P .3d 146, 153 (Ct. App. 2009) ("[I]t is permissible for a prosecutor to ask the jury 
to do justice if that request is in the context of argument addressing how trial 
evidence demonstrates the defendant's guilt. Justice is, after all, the goal of any 
criminal trial."). Rather, the prosecutor's rebuttal argument was a proper, 
measured response to Ciccone's argument that the jury should "hold [Ciccone] in 
[their] hands" and only find him guilty of "accidentally" plowing into his wife at 50 
mph, killing her and their unborn child. Because the argument, viewed in 
context, was proper and did not clearly violate Ciccone's constitutional right to 
due process, Ciccone's appellate challenge to the argument fails on the first two 
prongs of Perry. 
Even if this brief portion of the prosecutor's rebuttal argument could be 
deemed clearly improper, Ciccone's appellate challenge to the argument fails on 
the third prong of the Perry fundamental error analysis because Ciccone has 
failed to demonstrate that the error actually affected the outcome of the trial. The 
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sole contested element at trial was Ciccone's intent. Referring to Kathleen's 
death as a tragedy and asking the jury to "[g]ive her life meaning and give her 
death the sense of justice that it requires," did not so infect the trial with 
unfairness that it violated due process because it could not have influenced the 
jury to convict Ciccone of first-degree murder without sufficient evidence, 
particularly since the jury could have believed conviction of a lesser offense 
would be adequate to give Kathleen's "life meaning" and "her death the sense of 
justice that it requires." See Adamcik, _ P.3d at _, 2012 WL 206006 *33 
(finding prosecutor's appeal to jurors' sympathy for homicide victim's family was 
harmless and stating: "If the evidence presented did not convince the jury, it is 
highly unlikely that the jury's sympathy for [the victim] and her family would have 
changed its mind."). 
Because Ciccone's claims of prosecutorial misconduct raised for the first 
time on appeal do not constitute error, much less fundamental error, he is not 
entitled to relief. Ciccone is likewise not entitled to relief on the single claim of 
prosecutorial misconduct he did preserve for appeal because, to the extent the 
prosecutor's comments were improper, any potential prejudice was addressed by 
the court's curative instruction. 
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II. 
The District Court Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts In Concluding That 
Ciccone Failed To Establish A Violation Of Either His Statutory Or Constitutional 
Speedy Trial Rights 
A. Introduction 
A week before trial, the state filed a motion to continue, asserting as the 
primary basis for its request that many of its witnesses were active duty military 
personnel on temporary duty (''TOY'') outside the state and unavailable for trial. 
(R., vol. I, pp.102-09.) The district court granted the motion over Ciccone's 
objection and reset the trial for January 7, 2005, approximately one year after the 
filing of the Information. (R., vol. I, pp.114-17.) Ciccone subsequently filed a 
motion to dismiss, claiming a violation of his statutory and constitutional speedy 
trial rights. (R., vol. I, pp.168-69.) The district court denied the motion and the 
case proceeded to trial. (R., vol. I, pp.180-85; R., vol. II, pp.226-85.) 
Ciccone challenges the denial of his motion to dismiss, arguing that the 
delay of almost 15 months from his arrest and almost one year from the filing of 
the Information to the date of his trial violated his statutory and constitutional 
speedy trial rights. (Appellant's brief, pp.21-38.) A review of the record and the 
applicable law, however, supports the district court's determination that the delay 
was reasonable and did not violate Ciccone's speedy trial rights. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether there was an infringement of a defendant's right to a speedy trial 
presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 257, 
16 P.3d 931, 933 (2000); State v. Avila, 143 Idaho 849,852, 153 P.3d 1195, 
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1198 (Ct. App. 2006). The appellate court defers to the trial court's findings of 
fact that are supported by substantial and competent evidence, but freely reviews 
the trial court's application of the law to the facts found. Avila, 143 Idaho at 852, 
153 P.3d at 1198, State v. Davis, 141 Idaho 828,835,118 P.3d 160, 167 (Ct. 
App.2005). 
C. Ciccone Has Failed To Show A Violation Of His Statutory Right To A 
Speedy Trial 
1. The District Court Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts In 
Concluding That Good Cause Existed To Continue The Trial 
Beyond The Six-Month Statutory Speedy Trial Period Of I. C. § 19-
3501 
Idaho Code § 19-3501 supplements the speedy trial provisions of the 
United States and Idaho Constitutions and sets forth specific time limits within 
which a criminal defendant must be brought to trial. State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 
255, 257, 16 P.3d 931, 933 (2000). Specifically, the portion of the statute 
relevant to this case provides: 
The court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, must 
order the prosecution or indictment to be dismissed, in the following 
cases: 
(2) If a defendant, whose trial has not been postponed upon 
his application, is not brought to trial within six (6) months from the 
date that the information is filed with the court. 
I.C. § 19-3501 (2). For purposes of this statute, "good cause means that there is 
a substantial reason that rises to the level of a legal excuse for the delay." Clark, 
135 Idaho at 260, 16 P.3d at 936 (citing State v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 56, 58, 803 
P.2d 557, 559 (Ct. App. 1990); State v. Stuart, 113 Idaho 494, 496, 745 P.2d 
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1115, 1117 (Ct. App. 1987); accord State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 116,29 P.3d 
949, 952 (2001). 
There is no fixed rule for determining whether good cause exists to delay 
a trial and, as such, the matter is initially left to the discretion of the trial court. 
Young, 136 Idaho at 116, 29 P.3d at 952 (citing Clark, 135 Idaho at 260,16 P.3d 
at 936). The trial court's discretion is not unbridled, however, and its decision is 
subject to independent review on appeal. & Ultimately, "whether legal excuse 
has been shown is a matter for judicial determination upon the facts and 
circumstances of each case." Clark, 135 Idaho at 260, 16 P.3d at 936 (citing 
Johnson, 119 Idaho at 58,803 P.2d at 559; Stuart, 113 Idaho at 496,745 P.2d at 
1117). 
In this case, the state filed the Information charging Ciccone with two 
counts of first degree murder on January 27, 2004. (R, vol. I, pp.60-61.) 
Ciccone's trial was originally set to commence on July 20, 2004 (R, vol. I, pp.62-
63, 66-67), one week before the expiration of the sixth-month statutory speedy 
trial period of I.C. § 19-3501(2). On July 16, 2004, the state filed a motion to 
continue the trial, asserting as the primary basis for its request that several of its 
witnesses were active duty military personnel assigned to temporary duty ("TDY") 
outside the state and were unavailable for trial. (R, vol. I, pp.1 02-1 09.) The 
district court conducted a hearing on the motion, at which Ciccone's trial counsel 
objected to a continuance and asserted Ciccone's speedy trial rig hts. (7/19/04 
Tr., p.19, L.13 - p.24, L.7.) After considering all of the information before it, the 
district court granted the state's request for a continuance, finding that the state 
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had carried its burden of demonstrating good cause for the delay.3 (7/19/04 Tr., 
p.26, L.24 - p.32, L.8.) Contrary to Ciccone's arguments on appeal, application 
of the law to the facts and circumstances of this case supports the district court's 
determination that the state's witnesses were unavailable and, as such, good 
cause existed to continue the trial.4 
It is well established that the unavailability of a witness constitutes a valid 
reason to justify delay of a trial. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531 (1972); 
Clark, 135 Idaho at 260,16 P.3d at 936; Davis, 141 Idaho at 837,118 P.3d at 
169. To demonstrate witness unavailability, the state is required to show more 
than mere inconvenience, i.e., that "attendance at trial would be burdensome." 
3 In finding good cause, the district court specifically stated that it had relied on, 
among other things, "the affidavits and statements of the State." (7/19/04 Tr., 
p.27, L.23 - p.28, L.3.) According to the Register of Actions, the state only filed 
one affidavit in support of its motion for a continuance. (See R., vol. I, p.5.) The 
affidavit, in which the prosecutor merely attested that the facts contained in the 
motion for a continuance were all true, has been included by augmentation in the 
appellate record in Docket No. 36877. (See Docket No. 36877 Court File: 
5/18/09 Order Granting Uncontested Motion To Augment The Record.) 
4 In addition to asserting the unavailability of several of its witnesses, the state 
also asserted as ancillary bases for its request for a continuance that: 1) the 
defense had only very recently provided the state with the curriculum vitae of its 
accident reconstruction expert (R., vol. I, pp.105-06; 7/19/04 Tr., p.15, L.9 - p.16, 
L.22), and 2) the parties needed more time than originally allotted to fully try the 
case (7/19/04 Tr., p.16, L.25 - p.19, L.9). The district court considered each of 
these asserted bases as factors in its decision to grant the state's motion for a 
continuance (7/19/04 Tr., p.27, L.23 - p.28, L.23, p.31, Ls.12-21) but, in 
evaluating the reason for the delay, ultimately focused on the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the unavailability of the state's witnesses (7/19/04 Tr., 
p.28, L.24 - p.30, L.11). The state believes the trial court's determination as to 
the unavailability of witnesses is dispositive of Ciccone's statutory speedy trial 
claim and therefore limits its analysis of the reason for delay to this issue. The 
state, however, does not waive these additional grounds for delay but relies on 
and incorporates by reference herein the prosecutor's argument and the district 
court's rationale. 
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Clark, 135 Idaho at 260, 16 P.3d at 936; Davis, 141 Idaho at 837, 118 P.3d at 
169. Rather, "[t]rue unavailability suggests an unqualified inability to attend." kL. 
Although the Idaho appellate courts have never addressed whether a witness' 
assignment to military duty constitutes unavailability for purposes of determining 
whether good cause exists to delay a trial, other courts that have considered the 
issue hold that the unavailability of a material witness due to service in the United 
States armed forces constitutes sufficient justification for delay. See,~, Bell v. 
State, 651 S.E.2d 218, 219-20 (Ga. App. 2007); Commonwealth v. Hyland, 875 
A.2d 1175, 1190-92 (Pa. 2005); Kelley v. Commonwealth, 439 S.E.2d 616, 619 
(Va. App. 1994). 
In its written motion for a continuance, the state identified seven material 
witnesses, six of whom the state represented were either TDY or otherwise 
unavailable for trial due to active duty military service. (R., vol. I, pp.103-105.) At 
the hearing on the state's motion, the prosecutor elaborated on the witnesses' 
status, noting that three of them (Michael Almond, Jeremy Christianson and 
Jason Delion) were on TDY assignment in South Korea, and that a fourth (Steve 
Brown) was on active National Guard duty in Texas preparing for a two-year 
deployment to Iraq. (7/19/04 Tr., p.9, L.18 - p.12, L.3.) The state also 
represented, both in its written motion and at the hearing, that, despite diligent 
efforts by the state, the names of most of the witnesses were not disclosed to the 
state because of military procedures until the end of June and that, upon 
disclosure, the state immediately sent out subpoenas but received information in 
July that many of the witnesses were unavailable due to their assignments in the 
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military. (R., vol. I, pp.102-03, 105; 7/19/04 Tr., p.9, Ls.1-25, p.11, Ls.15-21, 
p.24, L.1 0 - p.25, L.1.) 
In ruling on the state's motion for a continuance, the district court 
considered the state's representations and determined, based on the facts and 
circumstances of this case, that the state had established good cause for 
continuance of the trial beyond the six-month statutory speedy trial period of I.C. 
§ 19-3501. Specifically, the court explained: 
[IJt appears that the prosecution in this case did make efforts 
to be in touch with the Air Force with regard to these witnesses; 
that according to the affidavit the Information with regard to the 
witnesses was not provided until June; that the prosecution was not 
advised that some of those witnesses were out of the country, out 
of reach of the subpoena power of this court until July a few days 
prior to trial. 
Certainly hindsight is always 20-20. And the fact of the 
matter is that we must recognize that this is a military community 
and military do in fact have their own procedures and the United 
States is at the current time in a state of war in two countries. And 
that military personnel are being switched around, moved for 
training on a regular basis, which creates a problem for the 
prosecution. Probably even greater than those that are presented 
when the United States is not in that situation. 
Prosecution's representation is that it did not know that these 
witnesses would not be available until July. Intent is a key element 
in a first degree murder trial and certain of these witnesses directly 
relate to the issue of intent. Not only is the defendant ... entitled to 
a fair and speedy trial, but the people as well are entitled to a fair 
and speedy trial. And it would be ... an extreme hardship on the 
State to attempt to obtain these people on such short notice. It is 
possible they could not be obtained at all. 
(7/19/04 Tr., p.29, L.5 - p.30, L.11.) 
On appeal, Ciccone does not challenge the trial court's factual 
determination that certain witnesses identified by the state in its motion were 
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material to the state's case on the issue of Ciccone's intent. Nor does he dispute 
that at least six of the witnesses were TDY or otherwise assigned to armed 
forces duty out of the state. He argues, however, that the state was negligent in 
its efforts to locate the witnesses because, rather than conducting its own 
investigation, the state relied upon the Air Force's investigation to ascertain the 
witnesses' identities and whereabouts. (Appellant's brief, pp.27-28, 37.) 
Ciccone has failed to show error in the trial court's good cause determination, 
however, because he has failed to show either that the state was negligent, or 
that any negligence contributed to the unavailability of the witnesses who were 
on active military duty. 
As Ciccone repeatedly emphasizes on appeal, at the time he committed 
the murders in this case he was a Staff Sergeant in the United States Air Force, 
stationed at the Mountain Home Air Force Base. All of the witnesses the state 
identified in its motion for a continuance were active duty or retired military 
personnel who had knowledge of facts relevant to the crimes committed by 
another member of the armed forces. (R., pp.102-05.) Although Ciccone 
contends that the state should have duplicated the Air Force's investigative 
efforts, he has failed to cite any authority or point to any facts to establish that the 
state should have, or even could have, ascertained the witnesses' identities and 
whereabouts more expediently than was accomplished by the internal military 
investigation. The district court specifically found that the crime occurred in a 
military community, that the military has its own procedures, and that the state 
did make diligent efforts to obtain the information from the Air Force within the 
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deadlines for discovery. (7/19/04 Tr., p.29, Ls.5-17.) Ciccone's claim that the 
state was negligent in not conducting its own investigation not only ignores the 
trial court's factual findings, it also fails to take into account the unique facts and 
circumstances of this case. 
Even assuming the state was somehow negligent in not conducting its 
own investigation, Ciccone has failed to show how any such negligence actually 
contributed to the unavailability of the witnesses who were TDY or its functional 
equivalent. Admittedly, the state identified one witness (Robert Reagan) who 
was not on active duty and who, had the state made an earlier attempt to locate 
him, may have been available to testify at trial. (R., vol. I, p.104.) However, the 
remaining six witnesses were out of the state (or country) on orders of the federal 
government. There is simply no reason to believe that, had the state made 
earlier attempts to locate those witnesses, their military assignments would still 
not have prevented them from attending the July 2004 trial. Indeed, at least one 
court has recognized that a witness' military deployment is a circumstance 
beyond the state's control. See Commonwealth v. Hyland, 875 A.2d 1175, 1191 
(Pa. 2005) (the deployment of a material witness to the Middle East was a 
circumstance over which the prosecution had no control). 
Ciccone relies on an unpublished opinion, People v. Chardon, 2005 WL 
2866923 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005) (unpublished opinion), for the proposition that the 
state is required to do more than show that a witness has been deployed for 
military service in order to establish that the witness is "truly unavailable" for 
purposes of establishing good cause to delay the trial beyond the statutory 
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speedy trial period. (Appellant's brief, pp.28-29.) The trial court's reasoning in 
Chardon is unpersuasive, however, because it was subsequently disavowed by 
the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York who, in a published 
opinion, held that the complaining witnesses' deployment for military service in 
Korea constituted an "exceptional circumstance" under New York's speedy trial 
statute, such that the delay owing to the witness' unavailability during the period 
of military service could not be attributed to the state. People v. Chardon, 922 
NY.S.2d 127, 128-29 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011). 
This is not a case in which the state sought a continuance of the trial 
merely for the purpose of accommodating the witnesses' schedules. Compare 
State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 260-61, 16 P .3d 931, 936-37 (2000). Nor is it a 
case in which the state's negligence contributed to the unavailability of the 
witnesses. Compare Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652-53 (1992). 
The witnesses' military assignments were matters beyond the state's control and 
rendered the witnesses unavailable for trial. ~, Bell v. State, 651 S.E.2d 218, 
219-20 (Ga. App. 2007); Hyland, 875 A.2d at 1190-92; Kelley v. Commonwealth, 
439 S.E.2d 616, 619 (Va. App. 1994). The district court correctly determined, 
based on the facts and circumstances of this case, that the unavailability of the 
state's witnesses constituted good cause to delay Ciccone's trial beyond the six-
month statutory deadline of I.C. § 19-3501. Ciccone has failed to establish a 
violation of his statutory speedy trial rights. 
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2. If There Was A Statutory Speedy Trial Violation, It Was Harmless 
Even if the unavailability of the state's witnesses did not constitute good 
cause sufficient to justify delay of the trial beyond the six-month statutory period 
of I.C. § 19-3501, any error in the court's decision to continue the trial was 
harmless. Idaho Criminal Rule 52 provides that "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or 
variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." Where, 
as here, a defendant is facing felony charges, the remedy for a statutory speedy 
trial violation is dismissal without prejudice. See I.C. §§ 19-3501, 19-3506. 
Thus, even had the trial court dismissed the case on the basis of a statutory 
speedy trial violation, the state could have simply re-filed the charges and 
proceeded to trial against Ciccone in a new criminal action. But see State v. 
Stuart, 113 Idaho 494, 745 P .2d 1115 (Ct. App. 1987) (reversing felony judgment 
of conviction on basis of statutory speedy trial violation, albeit without engaging in 
harmless error analysis). 
The state relies upon the argument contained in section 11.0.4, infra, to 
show that the trial court's resetting of Ciccone's trial date several months beyond 
the statutory speedy trial deadline did not adversely affect Ciccone's due process 
rights to a fair trial. Errors that do not affect the fairness of the trial, where one is 
had, are generally not reviewable on appeal. See State v. Mitche", 104 Idaho 
493,500,660 P.2d 1336, 1343 (1983) (claim of error in preliminary hearing is not 
ground to vacate conviction after fair trial); Loomis v. Killeen, 135 Idaho 607, 613, 
21 P.3d 929, 935 (Ct. App. 2001) (claim of errors in preliminary parole hearing 
not reviewed where there was fair parole violation hearing). Because the record 
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shows that the alleged violation of I. C. 19-3501 of having Ciccone's trial set 
beyond the six-month statutory speedy trial deadline did not actually affect the 
fairness of his criminal proceeding or trial, the error is necessarily harmless. 
D. The District Court Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts In Concluding 
That Ciccone Failed To Establish A Violation Of His Constitutional Speedy 
Trial Rights 
"Both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, 
§ 13 of the Idaho Constitution guarantee to criminal defendants the right to a 
speedy trial." State v. Lopez, 144 Idaho 349, 352, 160 P.3d 1284, 1287 (Ct. App. 
2007). When analyzing claims of speedy trial violations under the state and 
federal constitutions, the Idaho appellate courts utilize the four-part balancing test 
set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 
(1972). State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327, _, 256 P.3d 735, 740 (2011); State v. 
Young, 136 Idaho 113,117,29 P.3d 949,953 (2001); Lopez, 144 Idaho at 352, 
160 P.3d at 1288; State v. Avila, 143 Idaho 849,853,153 P.3d 1195, 1199 (Ct. 
App.2006). The factors to be considered are: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the 
reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his or her right to a speedy 
trial; and (4) the prejudice occasioned by the delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. 
Contrary to Ciccone's arguments on appeal, balancing of these factors in 
this case supports the district court's determination that Ciccone failed to 
establish a violation of his constitutional rights to a speedy trial. 
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1. The Length Of The Delay. While Sufficient To Trigger Balancing. 
Does Not Weigh In Ciccone's Favor 
"The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until 
there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for 
inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance." Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. 
For purposes of the Sixth Amendment, "the period of delay is measured from the 
date there is 'a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints 
imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge.'" Lopez, 144 Idaho 
at 352, 160 P.3d at 1287 (citing United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 
(1971); Young, 136 Idaho at 117, 29 P.3d at 953.) Similarly, "[u]nder the Idaho 
Constitution, the period of delay is measured from the date formal charges are 
filed or the defendant is arrested, whichever occurs first." Young, 136 Idaho at 
117, 29 P.3d at 953, quoted in Folk, 151 Idaho at _, 256 P.3d at 740; Lopez, 
144 Idaho at 352, 160 P. 3d at 1287 (citations omitted). Once the balancing test 
is triggered, the length of delay also becomes a factor in and of itself. Avila, 143 
Idaho at 853, 153 P .3d at 1199. 
Ciccone was arrested on October 16, 2003, and the state brought him to 
trial on January 4, 2005. The state concedes that the delay of nearly 15 months 
is sufficient to trigger the Barker balancing test - but not by much. See Folk, 
151 Idaho at _, 256 P.3d at 741 ("Considering the crime charged [lewd 
conduct], a delay of almost one year is sufficient to trigger our inquiry into 
whether Defendant has been denied a speedy trial); State v. Campbell, 104 
Idaho 705,708,662 P.2d 1149, 1152 (Ct. App. 1983) (citing State v. Talmage, 
104 Idaho 249, 252, 658 P.2d 920, 923 (1983)) ("A delay of [approximately 12 
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months] is sufficient to trigger an inquiry into whether speedy trial has been 
denied."). As noted in Barker, the reasonableness of length of the delay must be 
evaluated in light of the nature of the offense for which the defendant is standing 
trial: "[T]he delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is 
considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge." Barker, 407 
U.S. 531. Considering the nature of the charges on which Ciccone was standing 
trial - two counts of first degree murder - the length of the delay was not 
substantial and does not weigh heavily in Ciccone's favor. 
Moreover, the length of the delay is not dispositive. None of the four 
Barker factors is by itself "either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding 
of a deprivation of the right of speedy triaL" Barker, 407 U.S. at 533. Because 
there were valid reasons for the delay, and because Ciccone was not unfairly 
prejudiced by the delay, the length of the delay should be excused. 
2. The Unavailability Of The State's Witnesses Constituted A Valid 
Reason For The Delay 
Implicit in the standards applicable to claims of constitutional speedy trial 
violations is the recognition that "pretrial delay is often both inevitable and wholly 
justifiable." Avila, 143 Idaho at 853, 153 P.3d at 1199 (citing Doggett v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 647, 656 (1992»; State v. Davis, 141 Idaho 828, 837, 118 P.3d 
160, 169 (Ct. App. 2005) (same). For that reason, different weights are assigned 
to different reasons for the delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. As explained by the 
Supreme Court: 
A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the 
defense should be weighted heavily against the government. A 
31 
more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts 
should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be 
considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances 
must rest with the government rather than with the defendant. 
Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to 
justify appropriate delay. 
kl at 531 (footnote omitted). 
Ciccone concedes on appeal that the state is not responsible for a month 
and a half of the nearly 15-month delay in bringing him to trial. (Appellant's brief, 
pp.24-25.) He also concedes that the state never deliberately delayed the case 
in order to hamper the defense. (Id., p.25.) He argues, however, that the 
remaining delay must be weighed against the state, contending that the state 
failed to present any valid reason to justify the delay in bringing him to trial. (Id., 
pp.25-34.) Ciccone's argument is without merit. For the reasons set forth in 
section II.C.I, supra, the district court correctly determined that the state's 
witnesses were unavailable and that their unavailability constituted a valid reason 
to justify an appropriate delay. Even if the state could be deemed to have been 
negligent in its preparation of the case, as suggested by Ciccone on appeal, a 
"delay resulting from negligence," though it must be considered, "is a more 
neutral reason that is weighed less heavily than delay intended to hamper a 
defense." Folk, 151 Idaho at _ 256 P.3d at 742-43 (citing Barker, 40 U.S. at 
531). Likewise, although the responsibility for the trial court's inability to 
reschedule Ciccone's trial for an additional six months must "rest with the 
government," the court's busy calendar is ultimately a neutral reason for the 
delay and, although it must be considered, does not weigh heavily against the 
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state. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531; State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255,261, 16 P.3d 931, 
937 (2000). 
3. Ciccone Did Not Timely Assert His Constitutional Speedy Trial 
Rights 
The third factor in the Barker analysis is whether and how the defendant 
asserted his constitutional right to a speedy trial. A defendant's assertion of his 
right is "entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the 
defendant is being deprived of the right." Barker, 407 U.S. at 531-32; Davis, 141 
Idaho 839, 118 P.3d at 171. "[F]ailure to assert the right will make it difficult for a 
defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial." kL 
Although Ciccone asserted his statutory right to a speedy trial at the July 
19, 2004 hearing on the state's motion for a continuance (7/19/04 Tr., p.19, 
Ls.13-23), he did not unequivocally assert a constitutional right to a speedy trial 
until he filed his motion to dismiss on December 20, 2004 (R., vol. II, pp.168-69; 
see also Trial Tr., p.41, L.18 - p.43, L.2). This assertion of rights came over 14 
months after his arrest and just two weeks before his January 4, 2005 trial was 
set to commence. Ciccone's assertion of his rights so late in the proceedings 
does not weigh in favor of dismissal under the Barker balancing test. See State 
v. Lopez, 144 Idaho 349,353, 160 P.3d 1284, 1288 (Ct. App. 2007); Davis, 141 
Idaho at 839, 118 P.3d at 171; State v. Rodriquez-Perez, 129 Idaho 29, 37, 921 
P.2d 206,214 (Ct. App. 1996). 
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4. Ciccone Failed To Establish That He Was Unfairly Preiudiced By 
The Delay 
The final and most important factor in the Barker analysis is the nature 
and extent of any prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the delay. 
Barker, 407 U.S. at 532; Lopez, 144 Idaho at 354, 160 P.3d at 1289; Davis, 141 
Idaho at 840, 118 P.3d at 172. As explained by the Idaho Supreme Court: 
Prejudice is to be assessed in light of the interests of defendants 
which the right to a speedy trial is designed to protect. Those 
interests are (1) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) to 
minimize anxiety and concern of the accused, and (3) to limit the 
possibility that the defense will be impaired. 
Young, 136 Idaho at 118, 29 P.3d at 954 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 532). Accord 
Lopez, 144 Idaho at 354-55, 160 P.3d at 1289-90; Avila, 143 Idaho at 854, 153 
P .3d at 1200; Davis, 141 Idaho at 840, 118 P.3d at 172. "The third of these is 
the most significant because a hindrance to adequate preparation of the defense 
'skews the fairness of the entire system.'" Lopez, 144 Idaho at 355, 160 P.3d at 
1290 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 532; State v. Hernandez, 133 Idaho 576, 583, 
990 P.2d 742, 749 (Ct. App. 1999)). 
There is no question that Ciccone was continuously incarcerated in jail for 
15 months while awaiting trial, and during that time he undoubtedly felt the 
anxiety and concern that any incarcerated individual would suffer. Despite 
Ciccone's argument to the contrary, however, there simply is no evidence in the 
record to support his claim that his defense was actually impaired by the delay. 
In fact, the only "prejudice" Ciccone cites is the fact that, at trial, one of the state's 
witnesses failed to recall having been asked a specific question at the preliminary 
hearing. (Appellant's brief, pp.35-36.) This fact hardly establishes impairment of 
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the defense, however, particularly since a review of the trial transcript shows that 
Ciccone's counsel ably cross-examined the state's witness and impeached her 
with her preliminary hearing testimony (see Trial Tr., p.520, L.9 - p.524, L.23, 
p.540, L.19 - p.542, L.19) and thereafter specifically made use of the witness' 
inconsistent statements during closing argument (see Trial Tr., p.1827, Ls.5-25). 
Ciccone's remaining claim - that, in light of one witness' lapse of memory "one 
must wonder how reliable any of the witness' testimony was so long after the 
fact" (Appellant's brief, p.36) - is speculative on its face and falls far short of 
demonstrating actual prejudice. See United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 
315 (1986) (alleging only a "possibility of prejudice is not sufficient to support" a 
claim of a speedy trial violation). 
5. A Balancing Of The Barker Factors Weighs Against A Finding Of A 
Speedy Trial Violation 
The four Barker factors, together with any other relevant circumstances, 
must be balanced and weighed to determine whether an individual's right to a 
speedy trial was violated. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533. In this case, although the 
length of the delay was sufficient to trigger a constitutional analysis, the 
remaining factors, on balance, weigh against a finding of a speedy trial violation. 
The state sought the delay for a valid reason and, although some of the delay 
was attributable to the court's calendar, Ciccone failed to timely assert his 
constitutional speedy trial rights and failed to demonstrate that he was unfairly 
prejudiced by the delay. Ciccone has therefore failed to show error in the denial 
of his motion to dismiss. 
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III. 
Ciccone Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The District Court's Sentencing 
Discretion 
A. Introduction 
The district court imposed a fixed life sentence upon Ciccone's conviction 
for the first degree murder of his wife, Kathleen, and a concurrent fixed 15-year 
sentence upon his conviction for the second degree murder of the fetus Kathleen 
was carrying when she died. (R., vol. II, pp.338-41.) Ciccone does not challenge 
the reasonableness of the fixed 15-year sentence in relation to his second 
degree murder conviction. He argues, however, that the fixed life sentence 
imposed upon his conviction for first degree murder "is excessive given any view 
of the facts." (Appellant's brief, p.38 (emphasis added).) In addition to applying 
the incorrect legal standard,5 the arguments Ciccone advances in support of his 
claim also fail to establish an abuse of discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The sentence imposed by a trial court is reviewed for a clear abuse of 
discretion. State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 875, 253 P.3d 310, 312 (2011); 
State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008); State v. Baker, 
136 Idaho 576,577,38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Zaitseva, 135 Idaho 
11, 13 P.3d 338 (2000)). 
5 The correct standard is whether the "sentence was excessive under any 
reasonable view of the facts." State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 253 P.3d 310, 
312 (2011) (emphasis added) (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
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C. Ciccone Has Failed To Establish That The Fixed Life Sentence Imposed 
Upon His Conviction For The First Degree Murder Of His Pregnant Wife Is 
Excessive Under Any Reasonable View Of The Facts 
Ciccone was convicted, after a ten-day jury trial, of first degree murder. 
(R., vol. II, pp.286-89.) The victim, Ciccone's wife, was only 22 years old and 
was 11 weeks pregnant when Ciccone deliberately ran her down with his car. 
(PSI, p.19.) Despite the fact that the jury found Ciccone guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt of intentionally, and with premeditation, murdering Kathleen, 
Ciccone has never accepted responsibility nor expressed any remorse for the 
criminality of his actions. Ciccone's character, together with the egregiousness 
of the offense, his history of violence and his lack of rehabilitative potential, all 
support the district court's sentencing determination that society deserves to be 
protected from Ciccone for the rest of his natural life. 
The applicable legal standards for reviewing a sentencing court's exercise 
of discretion are well established. Where, a sentence is within statutory limits, 
the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of 
discretion. State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873,875,253 P.3d 310,312 (2011); 
State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008). To carry this 
burden the appellant must show that the sentence is excessive under any 
reasonable view of the facts. Windom, 150 Idaho at 875, 253 P.3d at 312 
(citations omitted). A sentence is reasonable, however, if it appears necessary to 
achieve the primary objective of protecting society or any of the related 
sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution. kL. at 875-76, 253 
P.3d at 312-13; State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576,577,38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001). 
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First degree murder is punishable by a maximum allowable sentence of 
fixed life imprisonment. I.C. § 18-4004. Because the fixed life sentence imposed 
upon Ciccone's conviction is within the statutory limit, Ciccone bears the burden 
on appeal of showing that his sentence is excessive. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 
598, 604, 768 P.2d 1331, 1337 (1989). On appeal, the question before this 
Court is not what sentence it would have imposed, but rather, whether the district 
court abused its discretion. State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148-49, 191 P.3d 
217, 226-27 (2008) (citing State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 
710 (Ct. App. 1982)); see also Windom, 150 Idaho at 875, 253 P.3d at 312 
(,,[W]here reasonable minds might differ, the discretion vested in the trial court 
will be respected, and this Court will not supplant the views of the trial court with 
its own."). Although Ciccone's sentence is unquestionably weighty, he has not 
demonstrated from the record any abuse of discretion in the district court's 
determination that a fixed life term of imprisonment was not only warranted, but 
also necessary, under the facts of this case. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held: "To impose a fixed life sentence 
requires a high degree of certainty that the perpetrator could never be safely 
released back into society or that the nature of the offense requires that the 
individual spend the rest of his life behind bars." Windom, 150 Idaho at 876, 253 
P.3d at 313 (citing Stevens, 146 Idaho at 149, 191 P.3d at 227; State v. Cross, 
132 Idaho 667, 672, 978 P.2d 227, 232 (1999)) (internal quotations and 
emphasis omitted); accord State v. Perez, 145 Idaho 383, 388, 179 P.3d 346, 
351 (Ct. App. 2008) (quoting State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635,638,759 P.2d 926, 
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929 (Ct. App. 1988)) (a fixed life sentence "should be regarded as a sentence 
requiring a high degree of certainty - certainty that the nature of the crime 
demands incarceration until the perpetrator dies in prison, or certainty that the 
perpetrator never, at any time in his life, could be safely released."). This "high 
degree of certainty" is generally satisfied where "the offense is so egregious that 
it demands an exceptionally severe measure of retribution and deterrence, or if 
the offender so utterly lacks rehabilitative potential that imprisonment until death 
is the only feasible means of protecting society." Perez, 145 Idaho at 388, 179 
P.3d at 351 (emphasis added). Although Ciccone argues otherwise, the record 
clearly shows the existence of both of these circumstances in this case. 
The egregiousness of Ciccone's offense was established at trial through 
physical evidence and the testimony of several witnesses who were either at the 
scene when Kathleen died or who responded to and investigated the scene 
shortly after her death. Before Ciccone hit Kathleen with his car, a neighbor 
heard him revving his engine and peeling out. (Trial Tr., p.722, L.13 - p.723, 
L.7.) He raced down the dirt road at a speed at or near 50 miles per hour and, 
without braking or attempting to maneuver his vehicle, plowed the car into 
Kathleen, causing her to strike her head on the car and then fly into the air, 
through a fence and, ultimately, land against a tree 75 feet away from the point of 
impact. (Trial Tr., p.1000, L.21 - p.1003, L.15, p.1042, Ls.2-9 p.1112, L.4 -
p.1131, L.17.) Kathleen suffered multiple massive skull fractures and she and 
her unborn child died at the scene. (Trial Tr., p.563, L.23 - p.565, L.21, p.576, 
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L.21 - p.577, L.14, p.603, L.18 - p.604, L.4, p.664, L.25 - p.667, L.10, p.1309, 
Ls.1-24.) 
Although he had just run over his pregnant wife, Ciccone only applied his 
brakes in an unsuccessful attempt to avoid a mailbox on the side of the road. 
(Trial Tr., p.1112, L.4 - p.1114, L.18.) By the time Ciccone stopped and got out 
of his vehicle, Darlene Shaw, the owner of the property on which Kathleen's body 
landed, had already rushed to Kathleen's aid. (Trial Tr., p.506, L.25 - p.509, 
L.19, p.511, L.9 - p.515, L.12.) Ciccone was very composed; he peered from a 
distance at Kathleen's body and then made a call on his cell phone, but not to 
911. (Trial Tr., p.515, L.23 - p.517, L.20.) Ms. Shaw implored Ciccone to come 
back, but he refused and continued walking down the road away from the scene. 
(Trial Tr., p.518, L.16 - p.519, L.11.) 
Ms. Shaw and her daughter contacted 911, and paramedics and law 
enforcement were dispatched to the scene. (Trial Tr., p.635, L.3 - p.638, L.13, 
p.639, Ls.11-23.) Alan Roberts was the first person to respond. Approximately 
one-quarter mile before he reached the crash site, Mr. Roberts observed Ciccone 
walking down the road the opposite direction. (Trial Tr., p.598, L.10 - p.599, 
L.18.) Mr. Roberts made three attempts to talk to Ciccone. (Trial Tr., p.599, L.19 
- p.600, L.12.) The first time, Ciccone did not respond; the second time, he 
waved Mr. Roberts off; the third time, he responded, "she needs your help worse 
than I do," and kept walking away from the scene. (Trial Tr., p.599, L.19 - p.601, 
L.16, p.627, Ls.4-9.) Law enforcement and rescue personnel subsequently 
found Ciccone in the desert about a mile and a half away. (Trial Tr., p. 609, L.1 -
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p.611, L.19, p.669, L.6 - p.671, L.22, p.992, L.18 - p.993, L.3, p.1165, Ls.8-13, 
p.1179, Ls.14-16, p.1311, L.18 - p.1313, L.11.) He claimed to have blacked out, 
but a CT scan and physical examination detected no sign of head trauma or 
other abnormalities. (Trial Tr., p.614, Ls.5-12, p.672, L.5 - p.677, L.8, p.683, 
L.22 - p.684, L.22, p.1166, L.5 - p.1167, L.4, p.1170, L.10 - p.1178, L.13, 
p.1181, L.16 - p.1182, L.9, p.1318, L.5 - p.1329, L.2.) He also made statements 
that led the lead detective on the case to suspect Ciccone was feigning his 
claimed amnesia. (State's Exhibit 62, pp.36-37; PSI, p.3; 10/16/03 Elmore 
County Sheriff's Department report of Detective Catherine M. Wolfe (included 
with PSI), pp.6-8.) 
Throughout the proceedings in this case Ciccone claimed that Kathleen's 
death was an accident, caused by his careless driving. As set forth above, 
however, the physical evidence and Ciccone's bizarre behavior overwhelmingly 
established that Ciccone deliberately ran Kathleen down. Ciccone's continued 
claim on appeal that Kathleen's death was an accident is simply not borne out by 
the evidence and is directly contrary to the jury's findings of fact. 
Ciccone asks this Court to ignore the egregiousness of the offense and 
focus instead on his potential for rehabilitation, which he claims is demonstrated 
by his family support, military service and lack of a prior criminal record. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.40-43.) He also asks this Court to consider his mental 
condition as a mitigating factor that militates against the fixed life sentence 
imposed upon his conviction for first degree murder. (Appellant's brief, pp.43-
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50.) Contrary to Ciccone's assertions, however, none of these factors renders 
his fixed life sentence unreasonable. 
Although Ciccone has the support of his family, has served in the military 
and has no prior criminal record, he is not the upstanding, compassionate man of 
generally good character that he portrays himself to be. Rather, in looking at the 
presentence report, including the materials submitted by members of his own 
family, it is clear Ciccone has always had an explosive temper. In a letter 
attached to the presentence report, Ciccone's sister wrote: "Frustration, anger, 
hurt, loneliness, depression, sorrow, pain, boredom, all of those emotions 
seemed to come out in fits of rage in both men in our family, my dad and my 
brother." (PSI, p.13.) Ciccone's ex-wife stated that Ciccone was "very 
controlling, closed and jealous" and was "physically abusive throughout their 
marriage." (PSI, p.15; U.S.A.F. Report of Investigation (included with PSI), § 2-
13.) She estimated Ciccone "hit her once a month or at least once every other 
month during their entire marriage." (PSI, p.15.) 
The foregoing accounts are also entirely consistent with Ciccone's 
treatment of Kathleen. According to witnesses, Ciccone was controlling and 
jealous and he verbally and physically abused Kathleen. (Trial Tr., p.1211, L.18 
- p.1212, L.19, p.1247, L.5 - p.1249, L.3, p.1350, LA - p.1353, L.1, p.1354, 
Ls.2-4, p.1357, L.25 - p.1358, L.25, p.1440, L.22 - p.1446, L.1; 10/23/03 
Supplemental Report of Detective Captain Mike Barclay (included with PSI); 
U.S.A.F. Report of Investigation (included with PSI), §§ 2-2 - 2-5, 2-7, 2-9.) He 
had previously attempted to run her over (Trial Tr., p.1949, Ls.3-7) and, on the 
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day she died, there was evidence at the scene that suggested Ciccone had 
engaged in a physical confrontation with her. (Trial Tr., p.883, L.18 - p.888, LA.) 
Thus, despite Ciccone's claims to the contrary, his act of callously running 
Kathleen down and leaving her and her unborn baby to die was entirely 
consistent with his character. 
Ciccone also asks this Court to consider "his fragile mental state" as a 
factor mitigating against the life sentence he received. (Appellant's brief, pA3.) 
He notes that he has a family history of mental illness and that he himself 
attempted to commit suicide and claims, in light of this, that mental illness must 
have had a central role in the commission of the offense. (Appellant's brief, 
ppAO-50.) Ciccone fails to point out, however, that although he specifically 
requested and received a psychological evaluation at public expense (R, vol. II, 
pp.332-33; 3/21/05 Tr., p.73, Ls.9-24), he chose not to utilize the information 
gleaned from that evaluation for the purposes of sentencing (Trial Tr., p.1880, 
L.12 - p.1882, L.1), thus depriving the district court of any opportunity to evaluate 
the nature and extent of Ciccone's mental condition andlor his amenability to 
treatment. Instead, he asks this Court for the first time on appeal to conclude his 
sentence is excessive simply because of his family history of mental illness and 
his own prior suicide attempt. There is no evidence, however, that he in fact has 
a mental illness or that his suicide attempt was the result of such an illness, as 
opposed merely to attention-seeking behavior, a scenario which is entirely 
plausible given the evidence of his volatile relationship with Kathleen and his 
desire to control her. (See U.S.A.F. Report of Investigation (included with PSI), § 
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2-3 (witness report that Ciccone had previously admitted faking a seizure to 
prevent Kathleen from leaving him).) 
The district court considered all the information before it, applied the 
correct legal standards and correctly determined the appropriate sentence in light 
of the egregious nature of the offense and Ciccone's character, which shows him 
to be utterly lacking in rehabilitative potential. The sentence imposed was not 
only warranted, but also necessary to achieve the primary sentencing objective 
of protecting society. Ciccone has failed to carry his burden of establishing that 
the sentencing court abused its discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Ciccone's conviction 
and sentence. 
DATED this 29th day of February 2012. 
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